Our paper estimates the extent to which employees are compensated for an unfavorable job characteristic, being required to accept mandatory assignment of overtime, by receiving higher straight-time wages. Our estimating equations are derived from a model in which wage rates and the existence of mandatory assignment of overtime are jointly determined in the market by the interaction of employee and employer preferences. While on average, we do not observe the existence of a compensating wage differential for mandatory overtime, we do observe the existence of such differentials for unionized workers and workers with only a few years experience at a firm.
Introduction
The overtime pay premium provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) currently regulate only two dimensions of the hours of work relationship; the number of hours after which the overtime premium goes into effect (40) and the premium's level (time and a half). In their legislation several European countries regulate other dimensions; for example they require either prior governmental approval for overtime and/or for employees to give their consent to working overtime.1 A bill to amend the FLSA introduced recently into Congress, would have similarly prohibited mandatory assignment of overtime in the United States.2 A rationale for many forms of protective labor legislation is that they are attempts to correct for failures of private markets and overtime hours legislation can be analyzed with this in mind.3 For even if both employers and their employees were satisfied with long workweeks and no premium pay for overtime, their private calculations ignore the social costs of unemployment. An overtime premium can be thought of as a tax to make employers bear the full marginal social cost of their hours decisions; its intent is to reduce the use of overtime hours and stimulate employment growth. The payment of the premium directly to employed workers may be justified if market imperfections prevent workers from freely choosing their desired workweeks and force them to work "excessively" long hours. The payment can then be seen as an attempt to reduce their disutility from long workweeks.
Proposals to legislate prohibitions against mandatory overtime can be viewed as being based upon the belief that market Imperfections persist In the labor market and that the overtime premium does not fully compensate employees for the disutility associated with mandatory overtime. However, one may question if markets have failed here; there appear to be a variety Survey, who reported working overtime, also reported that the overtime hours decision was made unilaterally by their employer and that overtime was mandatory, in the sense that employees who refused it suffered a penalty. 4 In addition, roughly 20 percent of employees covered by major collective bargaining agreements in 1976 had explicit provisions in their contracts that gave them the right to refuse overtime.5
To the extent that labor markets are competitive and establishments do offer a variety of overtime hours provisions (i.e., employer determines, employee determines, penalty for refusal, etc.), compensating wage differentials should arise. That is, establishments which offered "distasteful" mandatory overtime provisions would have to pay either higher straight-time wages, higher overtime premiums, or higher fringe benefits to attract labor than would establishments in which such provisions did not occur. If straight-time wage, overtime premium, or fringe benefit differentials exist that fully compensate employees for the disutility of mandatory overtime provisions, no case for legislated prohibitions against mandatory overtime is present.6 As such, evidence on the extent to which such compensating differentials currently do exist is of importance to policymakers.7
Our paper first attempts in the next section to estimate tb extent to which employees currently are compensated, in the form of higher straighttime wages, for being required to work mandatory overtime. Our focus is on compensating straighttime wage differentials because the data base we use, the 1977 Michigan Quality of Employment Survey (QES), contains no information on the value of fringes and because preliminary analyses suggested that the 3 magnitude of the overtime premium was not correlated with the presence of mandatory overtime rules, other variables held constant. Our estimating equations are derived from a model in which wage rates and the existence of mandatory assignment of overtime are jointly determined in the market; an employee's willingness to work mandatory overtime is positively related to the premium he would receive for working mandatory overtime, while an employer's demand for mandatory overtime provisions is negatively related to the premium he would have to pay to institute this work rule.
Such a model leads naturally to the estimation of wage equations, using econometric techniques that correct for the sample selectivity problem.
Our empirical analyses do not provide strong support for the proposition that on average employees who work for establishments with mandatory overtime provisions tend to receive higher straight-time wages, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, they do suggest that there is a straight-time wage premium associated with mandatory overtime provisions for union workers and for workers with only a few years experience with a firm. We provide explanations for why these results might occur.
Given any estimated compensating wage differential for an unfavorable working condition, one must decide whether its magnitude is sufficiently large to allow one to conclude that the differential fully compensates workers for the disutility of being subject to the unfavorable working condition. In Section III we develop a methodology that can be used to answer this question, at least for the case of mandatory overtime provisions and other rules that restrict employees' choice of hours. 
The naive approach would involve estimating the paraneters of (2) Consistent estimates of the model specified in (l)-(5) can be obtained using an iterative procedure originally suggested by Lung-fei Lee (1978) and James Heckman (l979)) One can substitute the wage equations (2) and (3) into (1) and then (5) to obtain a reduced form probit selection model in which the probability of observing an individual working mandatory overtime i8 specified to be a function of all of the predetermined variables in the ode1 (the X. and 'r From estimates of this probit equation, one can compute estimates of variables (the inverse of the Mills ratio --see Heckman (1979) ) which are then added to the wage equations ( (2) and (3)) to control for the probability that an individual is observed working mandatory overtime. These "augmented" wage equations can then be estimated by ordinary lea9t squares and consistent parameter estimates of equations (2) and (3) obtained.14 Finally, these estimated parameters and the mean values of the explanatory variables can be substituted back into (4) to compute consistent estimates of the straight-time wage differential associated with the presence of mandatory overtime provisions.
The data we use to implement the above framework come from the 1977
Michigan Quality of Employment Survey.15 We eliminated from the original 1515 individuals in the survey who were employed full-time those individuals who failed to report their straight-time hourly wage rate and/or whether they were required to work mandatory overtime. An individual was said to be required to work mandatory overtime if he or she reported that he or she could not refuse to work overtime without a penalty. This left us with a usable sample of 1108 observations,of which 165, or 14.89 percent, were categorized as being employed in a job that required mandatory overtime.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 present OLS estimates of wage equations (equations (2) and (3)), estimated separately for individuals in the mandatory overtime and nonmandatory overtime, or voluntary overtime, sectors.
We estimated three equations for each sector to permit us to test later for the sensitivity of our estimated differential to the specification of the We also estimated several reduced form probit equations (equation (5)), one corresponding to each specification of the wage equations, that explain whether an individual is employed by a firm requiring mandatory overtime.
The explanatory variables included in these equations are those that influence either employers' demands for an employee to work mandatory overtime or an employee's willingness to supply mandatory overtime, or that influence the wage paid in each sector, and hence the straight-time wage premium ( (4))paid for mandatory overtime.17 The pattern of coefficients did not vary across specifications and again for brevity we report only the simplest specification, which excluded the occupation and industry variables, in column (3) of Table 1 . Many of the variables in these equations enter 18 from both the employer and employee sides, and also from the wage equations.
Hence, it is difficult to predict what the expected signs of their coefficients should be in the reduced form probit model.
Column (3) indicates that while many of these variables' coefficients prove to be statistically insignificant, the chi-square statistic suggests that one can reject the hypothesis that the entire vector of coefficients is statistically insignificantly different from zero. Moreover, when we use these probit equations to compute predicted values of the inverse Mills ratios (A1, A1), enter these variables in equations (2) and (3) respectively, and then reestimate these augmented wage equations using OLS, the selectivity variables prove to be statistically significant, at least 11. at the .90 level of significance (Columns (4) and (5)),19 This provides some evidence that the estimated OLS wage coefficients may be inconsistent estimates of the true coefficients of the wage determination models, although as noted in footnote 13, the consistency of the estimates when we control for selectivity bias is condition upon (5) being the correct underlying selection rule.
The coefficient estimates contained in Table 1 can be used along with equation (4) to compute estimates of the straight-time wage premium paid to workers who are required to work mandatory overtime. We do this initially for a representative worker who has the mean value of each of the characteristics (X) in the sample. The estimated premium is tabulated in the top row of Table 2 for each of the three specificatations of the wage equations, for both the OhS and the selectivity corrected estimates. Quite strikingly, in only one of the six cases is the estimated premium positive.
Onaveg, market forces do not seem to be producing a compensating wage differential for mandatory overtime.
Of course the fact that on average such a differential does not exist, does not imply that no workers in the economy are compensated for being required to work mandatory overtime. Two groups of workers that one might want to focus on, in particular, are those covered by collective bargaining agreements and those newly hired by firms.
Turning first to the role of collective bargaining, recently attention has been redirected to the many roles unions play in addition to seeking to increase their members' wages.2° Empirical studies have indicated that unions may affect productivity and labor turnover.2' In addition, it has been argued that unions may help to compensate for market failures by 12 providing information on unfavorable working conditions and/or by obtaining compensating wage differentials for employees who are employed under such conditions. Indeed, a recent study suggests that up to two-fifths of the estimated union/nonunion wage differential is simply a compensating differential because unionized employees tend to be employed in more structured and hence less desirable (from the perspective of the employees) work 22 settings.
Following this line of reasoning, one might hypothesize that unions will also achieve larger compensating wage differentials for mandatory overtime provisions for their members than those received by otherwise comparable nonunion employees. That is, markets may be sufficiently imperfect that compensating differentials might not arise in the absence of union pressure; unions may serve to help restore the differentials that would exist in the absence of these imperfections.
To test for this possibility, rows B and C of Table 2 present estimates of the percentage straight-time wage premium paid to workers required to work mandatory overtime in the union and nonunion sectors, respectively. These estimates again make use of the estimated wage equations; the differentials paid to union members are evaluated using the mean values of union members' characteristics, while those for nonunion members are evaluated at the mean values of nonunion employees' characteristics.23
The estimated differentials are positive in the union sector but are negative in the nonunion sector. The OLS estimates suggest that the straighttime wage premium paid to induce workers to accept jobs which require mandatory overtime is roughly 4.0 to 5.3 percent in unionized establishments, while those that control for selectivity bias place the differential in the range of 2.6 to 4.3 percent.
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Turning next to the role of job tenure, it is also plausible that whether a premium is paid for mandatory overtime depends upon an employee's job tenure. If an employer seeks to attract a new employee to a firm that requires mandatory overtime and job applicants know of this unfavorable working condition, a compensating wage differential will be required. In contrast, employees who have been with a firm for a number of years and have accumulated "firm-specific" human capital, may find that there is a wedge between the wage they are receiving and the wage they can command from other employers.24 As such, ex post, the employer may not have to pay them a compensating wage differential for newly instituted unfavorable working conditions.25 These employees' investments in firm-specific human capital limit the need for such differentials to arise.
This line of reasoning suggests that compensating wage differentials for mandatory overtime will be larger for employees with only a few years experience with a firm than they will be for long-term employees. To test this hypothesis, we divided our sample into employees with less than three years experience, and those with three or more years, with their current employer. OLS wage equations and the selectivity corrected wage equations were reestimated separately for each group and then the estimated straighttime wage premium paid to employers required to work mandatory overtime computed as before.
These estimated differentials are evaluated at the mean values of the characteristics for the individuals in each group and are reported in the last two lines of Table 2 . The hypothesis appears to be borne out, at least for the OLS estimates. The OLS estimates suggest that positive compensating differentials for mandatory overtime are paid to inexperienced workers with less than three years of job tenure, however no such diffetential is paid to workers with more than three years job tenures In contrast, the "selectivity corrected" estimates suggest that neither group receives a positive compensating differential for mandatory overtime Since we have only approximated the true sample selection rule (see footnote 13 and above), the statistical properties of the "selectivity corrected" estimates are not certain and it is not obvious which set of estimates should be considered preferred.
In sum, our results indicate that on average employees who work ot establishments with mandatory overtime provisions do not receive compensatingly higher straight-time wages. Focusing on what happens "on average", however, masks important differences between groupsb The data suggest that unionized employees do receive a straight-time wage premium for mandatory overtime; this provides support for the view (Duncan and Stafford (1980) ) that one role unions play is to establish compensating wage differentials for unfavorable working conditions. The data also provide some weaker support for the view that experienced workers, who are "tied" to firms, fail to receive compensating wage differentials for mandatory overtime, but that workers with less than three years experience with a firm do receive such dIfferentials. How one might attempt to judge whether the magnitude of any estimated differential is sufficient to fuUy compensate employees for being subject to mandatory overtime provisions is an issue to which we now turn. If one truly believes that all labor markets are competitive, then it is almost a tautology that whatever wage differentials are generated by markets will be "fully compensating" ones. However, once one allows for market imperfections, the question becomes an empirical one. In some cases, it Is possible to test whether the "compensating" differential is indeed "fully compensating". For example, Ehrenberg (1980) found that holding the factors that influence wages, promised retirement benefits, and the deterininants of total compensation constant, that for every dollar that public employees were required to contribute to their pension fund, their annual earnings increased by a dollar. It is straightforward to conclude here that the wage differential associated with employee retirement system contributions are fully compensating.
In contrast, in other situations it is not easy to establish whether compensating differentials are fully compensating. Estimates of the 16 compensating differential associated with the risk of fatal injury at the workplace suggest that individuals are paid a premium of 1 to 4 percent of their wages to compensate them for existing risks of fatal injuries.27
However, researchers have not evaluated whether such differentials truly fully compensate workers for the risks of fatal injury; all we know is that they are the differentials observed in the market. If labor markets are not perfectly competitive, there is no reason to assume that the differentials are in fact fully compensating. Hence, the potential usefulness of these estimates for public policy in the occupational safety area is unclear.
In the case of mandatory overtime, or any other employment package that specifies a tied wage rate-hours of work bundle, it is possible to evaluate whether the compensating wage differentials that are observed are fully compensating. To understand the logic of our approach, refer to Figure 1 where a familiar indifference curve model is plotted. The individual is assumed to derive utility from leisure time and income; the latter is a proxy for some Hicksian composite commodity whose price is taken as fixed. Suppose an individual has nonlabor income of OT, a wage rate of W0 for the first H hours per week that he works, and he receives an overtime premium of time and a half for all overtime hours. The individual then faces the budget constraint BAOT and, given his indifference map, will locate at point a working H0 hours and having a total income of Y0.28 Thus, his utility would be given by (6) U(Y0, L0) (=W0(l+d)) and H1, but not both. Furthermore, it is necessary for us to know the shape of the individual's indifference curve, something which is typically not directly observed.
Fortunately, there is a way in which one can deduce all of the necessary information. To do so requires one to assume a specific functional form for the utility function. To illustrate the methodology, we assume for expositional convenience that the individual's utility function is any monotonic transformation of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. Now given the utility function specified in (8) , if this individual was employed by a firm which did not require mandatory overtime he would work H0 hours, where H0 is given by (10) 
That is (10) represents the labor supply curve for individuals employed in the nonmandatory overtime sector. Now we do not observe W0 for the individual employed in the mandatory overtime sector, rather we observe W1, which equals W0(l+d). Hence, (10) can be written (11) 
H0
= aT + (ci-1)(M-.5(W1/(l+d))H)/(W1/(l+d))(1.5)
Observe that given a, everything on the right-hand side of (11) is known save for d. Moreover, for each value of d, there will exist a corresponding value of H0 and hence of Y0 and L0. Thus, we can specify the individual's utility from being employed by a firm in which mandatory overtime Is not required as a function of the size of the differential
One can then set (12) equal to (9) and solve for d*. The solution will be the fully compensating straight-time wage differential for mandatory overtime; it can be contrasted to the actual differentials that we have estimated.
Of course, to proceed along this line first requires an estimate of a and it is natural to obtain such an estimate from the sample of people who are employed by firms that do not require mandatory overtime.30 That is, for this sample of 943 individuals we estimate a labor supply function of the form (from (10)) (13) = aT + (a-1)Q. + c.
where
if H<H Estimation of (13) yields an estimate of a of .224, with an estimated 31 standard error of .001.
With this estimate in hand, we can compute U1, using (9) and the mean values of the variables for individuals employed by firms requiring mandatory overtime. Similarly, we can compute H0 and U0, conditional upon d, from (11) and (12) .32 Finally, equating U0 to U1 and solving the resulting nonlinear equation for d, yields our estimate of the fully compensating straight-time wage differential for mandatory overtime. Our data suggests that this would be approximately 1.1 percent.
This estimate, however, is conditional upon the Cobb-Douglas function being the correct functional form for the utility function. We have used it for illustrative purposes here because It requires us to obtain an estimate of only one parameter (ct), and this estimate could be obtained directly from estimates of the simple labor supply equation (13) . However, because the Cobb-Douglas form Is very simple and restrictive, results based on It should be considered only illustrative. While we choose not to proceed any further here because our analyses in the previous section suggested that on average compensating wage differentials for mandatory overtime do not exist, researchers working on similar problems should test the sensitivity of their estimates of the fully compensating differential to alternative assumptions about the functional form of the utility function and/or its parameter values.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Do employees who are employed by firms in which mandatory assignment of overtime is required receive compensating straight-time wage differentials? The evidence presented in this paper suggests that on average they do not; this presents some support for the case in favor of legislative prohibition of mandatory overtime. This conclusion should be qualified, however, because in some circumstances, namely for unionized employees and employees with short job tenure with their current employers, compensating wage differentials do exist. Furthermore, the benefits from the legislation must be weighted against the potential costs; these include reduced employer flexibility in scheduling production and consequently increased production costs.
We believe that variants of the methodological framework presented in this paper should prove useful in a number of other contexts for at least two reasons. On the one hand, we have suggested the Importance of modeling 22 the selection process and controlling for selectivity bias in the estimation of compensating wage differentials for undesirable job characteristics.
On the other hand, we have developed a framework that permits one to estimate if compensating differentials are in fact fully compensating. The latter is an important step in the analysis which previous investigators, who focused on related topics, often ignored or forgot to undertake, We would be less than honest if we did not acknowledge three major qualifications of the findings we have reported in this paper. First, it is conceivable that the model we used in Section III understates the true magnitudes of the fully compensating wage differential. As noted earlier, it assumes that individuals value only income and leisure time; the disutility from mandatory overtime provisions arises because employees are forced to work more hours than they otherwise would prefer. Suppose, however, that employees also value the way in which overtime hours are distributed across a week and mandatory overtime provisions cause them to lose control over this decision (e.g., "you can't work 1 hour overtime per day like you want but you have to work 5 hours Monday night"). In this case, even if total hours of work were unchanged, employees would still demand a premium for accepting mandatory overtime provisions. The model in Section III does not capture the need for such a premium.
Second, software limitations have prevented us from estimating the complete statistical model that is required to control for the joint employee/employer selection problem; the consistency properties of the selectivity adjusted wage equations and the associated wage differentials reported in Tables 1 and 2 It is not obvious that this is always a good assumption to make; a preferred approach would be to analyze the trade-offs between all characteristics simultaneously. However, to appropriately model the more general problem would require selection models for every job attribute and that, coupled with greatly reduced degrees of freedom and possible collinearity problems, may well lead to insignificant results. We suspect that this is why such an assumption is typically made.
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-WO Slope -W0(l+d) = L Leisure T-H T 17. We must caution that some of these variables (e.g., overtime hours, hours on second job or extent of unionization (see Duncan and Stafford (1980) ) are undoubtedly simultaneously determined with the presence of mandatory overtime provisions. To keep our problem manageable, we treat all of the variables in column 3 of Table 1 as being predetermined. We did experiment with omitting overtime hours from the reduced form probit equation;
such an omission actually increased the magnitude of the compensating wage differential for mandatory overtime above the level that we report below.
18. See for a discussion of why each of the explanatory variables enters the probit equation and its expected sign.
19. Our estimation of the "selectivity corrected" wage equations were facilitated by our colleague William Greene, who provided us with a computer program he has written to estimate such models.
20. For an excellent expository survey of this literature, see Richard
Freeman and James Medoff (1979) .
21. See, for example, Charles Brown and James Medoff (1978) , Kim Clark (1980) , and James Medoff (1979) .
22. Duncan and Stafford (1980) .
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. The sample sizes available were unfortunately too small to permit us to reestimate the model separately for union and nonunion employees and then to base estimated differentials on such equations.
24. See Gary Becker (1964) .
25. This statement should be qualified by noting that if, ex ante, job applicants expect to have long tenures with a firm and they are aware that an unfavorable working condition exists or may be instituted at the firm in the future, then they would accept employment only if they expected to receive compensating differentials throughout their tenure with the firm.
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Footnote 25 continued:
Our argument in the text essentially assumes that the unfavorable working condition was imposed unexpectedly (to them) sometime after the initial hire date.
26. For risk of injury, see Robert S. Smith (1976) and Richard Thaler and Sherwin Rosen (1975) . For nonwage forms of compensation, see Ronald Ehrenberg (1980) . For working conditions, see Greg Duncan (1976) and Duncan and Stafford (1980) . Finally, for risk of unemployment, see John Abowd and Orley Ashenfelter (1979) .
27. Robert Smith (1979) .
28.
The assumption that the individual would voluntarily choose to work overtime is not essential to what follows.
Our analysis assumes that the individual is concerned about total
hours of leisure in a week not how it is allocated across days. If he was concerned about the latter, he might require a premium to be employed by a firm requiring mandatory overtime even if H0 was equal to H1. This is a complication which we do not deal with here. We should also emphasize that the fully-compensating premium is a function of the gap between H1 and H0, not of the level of overtime that the individual actually works.
30. This procedure assumes that e is the same for individuals in both sectors --an assumption that is somewhat inconsistent with the model discussed previously in which Individuals are "sorted" into the mandatory sector at least partially on the basis of their willingness to work overtime.
Other things equal, we should expect to observe individuals with lower marginal utilities of leisure (higher cx's) to be In the mandatory sector.
As a result, the estimates of a which we obtain below from data on show that an increase in a will lead to a decrease in the magnitude of the fully-compensating wage differential, the value of d* which we report below may well overstate the true fully-compensating differential.
31. Variants of (13) 
